AFCC 50th Anniversary Conference
Riding the Wave of the Future:
Global Voices, Expanding Choices
May 29–June 1, 2013, JW Marriott Los Angeles L.A. LIVE
Los Angeles, California

There are eight pre-conference institutes to choose from this year! An institute can easily be added to your conference registration. Each institute offers up to six hours of continuing education and an intensive look at a fascinating topic. In the Judicial Officers Institute: Taking the Testimony of Children, presenters will focus on children's developmental stages and how judicial officers can ask questions to receive reliable answers. Attendance at this institute is limited to judicial officers. In Threats to Neutrality: Biases, Values, Paradigms and Cultural Insensitivity, custody evaluators will explore how biases, values and paradigms affect evaluator judgment; distinctions between attitudinal and cognitive biases will be discussed, as well as associative biases. In Risk Assessment for Family Law Professionals: Protecting Ourselves from Others, the presenter will cover threat assessments from a rapid scan to a comprehensive approach for dealing with potential threats.
Read more about these and the other institutes
Register online

Continuing Education
Earn up to 20.5 hours of continuing education for psychologists, lawyers, counselors, social workers, mediators, custody evaluators and mental health professionals. AFCC will apply for a number of specific approvals for California practitioners.
More information

Overflow Hotel
If the room nights you need are not available at the JW Marriott, AFCC has secured an additional block of rooms at the Sheraton Los Angeles, 711 Hope Street, at the rate of $169/night single or double. The Sheraton is a ten minute walk or a short cab ride from the Marriott. If you have held a room, but will not attend the conference, please cancel the reservation so an attendee may book the room.
More information

Donate to the Silent Auction
Held each year as part of the annual conference, the AFCC Silent Auction is a fun opportunity to support the organization’s special projects and initiatives like the Shared Parenting Think Tank and the Domestic Violence in Child Custody Evaluations Task Force. You can help support these efforts by donating an item or attending the auction and bidding. Past items include vacations, jewelry, sports memorabilia, fashion accessories, electronics, collectibles, books and much more. The auction is also a nice opportunity to relax and socialize before the annual banquet.
Donation form

Exhibit Space and Advertising Opportunities Available
Exhibiting and advertising at the AFCC annual conference are excellent ways to share your products and services with an interdisciplinary community of family law professionals. A limited number of exhibit spaces remain. Registration packet inserts ensure your marketing piece reaches each attendee.
More information

Ask the Experts
Ten Tips for Professionals: Using Online Communication in an Ethically Responsible Manner
By Allan E. Barsky, JD, MSW, PhD

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More information

Conference Platinum Sponsors

AFCC–AAML Conference
Advanced Issues in Child Custody: Evaluation, Litigation and Settlement
September 26–28, 2013
Gaylord National Resort
Washington, DC Metro Area
More information

AFCC Regional Training Conference
There’s No Place Like Two Homes: The Complexities of Separation, Divorce and Co-parenting
November 7–9, 2013
Many mediators, parenting coordinators, attorneys and other family-court-related professionals are using online technologies to facilitate communication between themselves and their clients. Online communication technologies may take the form of online videoconferencing or teleconferencing (e.g., Skype), text messaging, voice messaging, online chat-rooms, email, online calendars, online social networking (e.g., Facebook) and online programs designed to facilitate conflict resolution, communication, problem-solving, or implementation of parenting plans or financial arrangements. The following strategies are intended to help you navigate the ethical issues that arise should you decide to use one or more of these technologies.

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<td>AFCC is pleased to announce the AFCC-AAML 2013 Conference, <em>Advanced Issues in Child Custody: Evaluation, Litigation and Settlement</em>, to be held at the Gaylord National Resort and Conference Center of the Potomac, in the Washington, DC Metro Area. This is the second collaboration between AFCC and the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. Two-hour sessions will provide in-depth analysis; targeted breakout sessions for both legal and mental health professionals, as well as interdisciplinary audiences, ensure advanced training and collaboration across professions. Consultation breakfasts provide an informal opportunity to converse with your peers about your work. The conference program and registration will be available in May. Priority registration is open to AFCC and AAML members through June 30. Public registration opens July 1, 2013. More information</td>
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**Groundbreaking Same Sex Parent Case**

**Frazier v. Goudschaal**, 022213 KSSC, 103,487

*By Milfred "Bud" Dale, PhD, JD, and Linda D. Elrod, JD, Topeka, Kansas*

The former same-sex partner of the biological mother of two children conceived through artificial insemination filed to determine the existence of a mother-child relationship based on co-parenting agreements. The partners had agreed to "jointly and equally share parental responsibility." The District Court, finding subject matter jurisdiction via "highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances" and the Kansas Parentage Act, applied the best interests of the child and awarded joint legal custody and granted parenting time.
The Kansas Supreme Court found the co-parenting agreement was enforceable because its intent and effect was to promote the welfare and best interests of children who were third-party beneficiaries. The Court noted that, “Denying the children an opportunity to have two parents, the same as children of a traditional marriage, impinges upon the children’s constitutional rights.” The co-parenting agreement was not a prohibited sale of the children because the biological mother retained her parental rights. The agreement was not injurious to the public because it provided children with the resources of two parents. The Court remanded with instructions to further explore the best interests of the children.

Read the opinion

**AFCC Scholarship Fund**
Thank you to those generous members who have donated to this year’s annual appeal. If you have not donated yet—there is still time! As scholarship recipients are notified, we are reminded of how important this effort is. Although AFCC conferences are relatively inexpensive compared to other professional education conferences, registration fees, travel and hotel expenses can add up to attendance being cost prohibitive. Please know that the colleagues your donation assists are both incredibly grateful and incredibly worthy of your support.

Donate today

**Member News**
Gregg M. Herman, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has written a new book, *Settlement Negotiation Techniques in Family Law: A Guide to Improved Tactics and Resolution*, which brings together many of the concepts of divorce settlement negotiations to help lawyers improve their skills at divorce negotiation.

Have you recently written a book, won an award, or accepted a new job? Or do you know an AFCC member who has? Let us know so we can share the good news with members and colleagues in the AFCC eNEWS.

**Chapter News**
Please welcome new Chapter Presidents: Jason B. Castle, Arizona and Hon. Sandy Karlan, Florida.

**AFCC 50th Anniversary—Music of 1963**
Our nostalgic, fun piece about 1963, the year AFCC was founded, continues this month. Refresh your musical memory in preparation for the annual banquet entertainment! Conference attendees will enjoy the music of the Red Ball Jets, a cover band, playing hits from the 60s through today. Take a look at Grammy award winners through the years and if you're attending the 50th Anniversary Conference, perhaps plan a visit to the Grammy Museum—located in the L.A. LIVE entertainment complex.

**Family Law in the News**

*From “I Do” to “I’m Done”*

_Courtesy of New York Magazine_

It’s not a subject that marriage-equality groups tend to trumpet on their websites, but gay couples are at the start of a divorce boom. One reason is obvious: More couples are eligible. According to a report by UCLA’s Williams Institute, nearly 50,000 of the approximately 640,000 gay couples in the U.S. in 2011 were married. (Another 100,000 were in other kinds of legal relationships, such as domestic partnerships.) The marriage rate, in states that allowed it, was quickly rising toward the rate of heterosexual couples: In Massachusetts as of that year, 68 percent of gay couples were married, compared with 91 percent of heterosexual couples. Another reason for the coming boom is that while first-wave gay marriages have proved more durable than straight ones (according to the Williams Institute, about one percent of gay marriages were dissolving each year, compared with 2 percent for different-sex couples), that’s not expected to last. Most lawyers I spoke to assume that the gap will soon vanish, once the backlog of long-term and presumably more stable gay couples have married, leaving the field to the young and impulsive.

[Read more](#)

**Opinion Recap: Family Law Dispute Not Moot after Child’s Return**

_By Amy Howe, courtesy of SCOTUS Blog_

The Court’s decision in _Chafin v. Chafin_, appears to qualify as one of the easy ones. The case arises out of an international child custody dispute between an American father, Sgt. Jeff Chafin, and a Scottish mother, Lynne Chafin. Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, a parent whose child is abducted to another country can file a lawsuit in that country seeking to have the child returned to her home country, so that courts there can resolve any custody disputes. Pursuant to the Convention, Mrs. Chafin filed a lawsuit in federal district court in Alabama, asking that...
court to issue an order returning her daughter to Scotland. When the
district court ruled in her favor, the mother immediately left the
country with her daughter.
Read more
Continuing Education Credits
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Earn up to 20.5 hours of continuing education for psychologists, lawyers, counselors, social workers, mediators, custody evaluators and mental health professionals. AFCC will apply for a number of specific approvals for California practitioners.

AFCC will provide a certificate of conference attendance for a processing fee of $15 for members and $20 for non-members. The certificate will verify attendance at conference sessions and may be used to apply for continuing education credits with the registrant’s accrediting institution. A complete list of conference sessions eligible for continuing education credits will be available at the AFCC registration desk.

Psychologists: AFCC is approved by the American Psychological Association to sponsor continuing education for psychologists. AFCC maintains responsibility for the program and its content. The program is eligible for up to 19.5 hours of continuing education for psychologists.

Mental Health Professionals:
Continuing education approval from the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) is pending for up to 20.5 CE credits; however, individuals will need to verify approval with their credentialing or licensing boards.

AFCC is approved by the California Board of Behavioral Sciences to offer continuing education for MFT and LCSW professionals in California, PCE #4630. The pre-conference institutes provide 6 hours and the conference program provides up to 13.5 hours toward continuing education required by BBS.

AFCC is an NBCC-Approved Continuing Education Provider (ACEP™) and may offer NBCC-approved clock hours for events that meet the National Board of Certified Counselor requirements. The ACEP is solely responsible for all aspects of the program. Up to 20.5 hours may be earned.

Mediators: All conference sessions are eligible for continuing education units through the Association for Conflict Resolution.

California Custody Evaluators and Mediators: Applications will be submitted to the Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts.

Pre-conference Institute 4, Risk Assessment for Family Law Professionals, will include a brief research update on California case law and legislation per requirements of the four-hour domestic violence training update requirement, California Rules of Court, Rule 5.230, for California custody evaluators and mediators update training.

Certified Specialist Program: This program will be submitted for accreditation by the Law Society of Upper Canada toward the Family Law professional development requirement for certification.
Attorneys: Approval will be submitted to the California State Bar for up to 19.5 hours of continuing legal education. California attorneys must self-report hours at their recertification.

Minor’s Counsel: California Rules of Court, Rule 5.242, specifies that effective January 1, 2009, before being appointed as a minor’s counsel, counsel must have completed at least 12 hours of applicable education and training. Effective January 1, 2010, to remain eligible for appointment as counsel for a child, counsel must complete during each calendar year a minimum of 8 hours of applicable education and training. Pre-conference institutes provide 6 hours and the conference program provides up to 10.5 hours of applicable education and training.

MCLE: The pre-conference institutes provide 6 hours and the conference program provides up to 13.5 hours of MCLE credits. Attorneys must sign in on the sheets provided at each session.

CFLS: The pre-conference institutes provide 6 hours and the conference program provides up to 13.5 hours in the following required topics toward the educational requirement for CFLS certification: dissolution of marriage; mediation; custody of children; psychological and counseling aspects of dissolution of marriage; problems of the non-marital family; and problems of domestic violence.
Ask the Experts
Ten Tips for Professionals:
Using Online Communication in an Ethically Responsible Manner
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Many mediators, parenting coordinators, attorneys and other family-court-related professionals are using
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Skype), text messaging, voice messaging, online chat-rooms, email, online calendars, online social
networking (e.g., Facebook) and online programs designed to facilitate conflict resolution, communication,
problem-solving, or implementation of parenting plans or financial arrangements. The following strategies
are intended to help you navigate the ethical issues that arise should you decide to use one or more of
these technologies.

1. **Determine the most appropriate means of communication for a given purpose.**
As both professionals and clients embrace various forms of online communication in their private lives, it
may seem appropriate to use these same forms of communication for professional interactions. Before
using online technology for professional purposes, however, make sure your choice is deliberate—think
about the ethical issues that may arise maintaining confidentiality, creating a digital record of events that
could be used in court, responding to crisis situations, ensuring effectiveness of the intervention when
facilitated through online technologies, and maintaining appropriate boundaries in the professional-client
relationship. Consider a situation in which clients live in different cities. Videoconferencing may be more
convenient and less expensive than bringing everyone to the same location; if you are mediating,
however, will the process be as effective online as it would be with everyone in the same room? How will
you determine whether asynchronous or synchronous communication is more effective?

2. **Consult information and computer technology experts, and take responsibility for understanding the technology you are planning to use.**
Family professionals may need the assistance of computer experts to understand the options available
for online communication, as well as how to manage various risks to the integrity of your communication
(e.g., hacking, worms, malware, IP spoofing). Be careful about accepting the advice of experts without
understanding the reasons for their advice. Make sure you educate yourself, as you are the one who is
ultimately responsible for ensuring that your professional communications are safe and effective.

3. **Practice privately before using online communication professionally.**
Rather than experimenting with clients, practice the use of online technology privately. If you are planning
to videoconference, set up a practice conference with friends or professional colleagues. Role-play a
session to see not only how the technology is operated, but also how you will manage factors such as
lighting, location of microphones, angles of the camera, and colors. You may find out that a certain
camera angle makes you appear angry, or certain lighting washes out your facial expressions. You can
enhance the effectiveness of your professional interactions and avoid certain embarrassing situations by
practicing with others prior to using the technology for professional purposes.
4. Consult the research literature for best practices, effectiveness, and risks of using a particular online strategy.
Although there is relatively little research on the use of online technology for mediators and other family-court-related professionals, there is a growing body of literature on the use of online communication for medical and mental health practice (e.g. “tele-health”). Look for research that has gone through a scholarly review process. Be careful about how to interpret claims made by private companies trying to sell their products (e.g., web-based programs designed to facilitate problem-solving or conflict resolution, online calendars for managing parenting plans, etc.). Consider, for instance, an online program that allows family law professionals to monitor the pick-up and drop-off times as outlined in the parenting plan or mediation agreement. The provider may suggest that this program is “an essential tool” for mediators and parenting coordinators, claiming that it “reduces conflict and helps parents focus on the best interests of their children.” However, does the use of online monitoring fit within the role of a mediator? Or if a parenting coordinator plans to use such a program, how does s/he know that this is an effective tool… or whether it might incite greater conflict between the parents, to the detriment of the child?

5. Assess benefits and risks for particular situations.
When determining whether to use a particular form of online communication, consider the particular situation. Just because it may be appropriate for some clients and some professional functions, does not mean that it is appropriate for all. You might be comfortable communicating with clients using email in order to set dates for meetings. You might want to restrict email communication for discussion of other issues (e.g., communication of crises… which may be emailed to you in the middle of the night, or on a weekend when you are not working or checking email). You might decide to use a blog to educate clients about children’s reactions to separation and divorce; on the other hand, you might decide it is too risky to use a blog to discuss how to handle “difficult clients’ situations.”

6. Develop and implement risk management strategies for the risks you have identified.
When clients enter your office for a private session, you close the door to ensure confidentiality. This safeguard is a risk management strategy. Similarly, determine which risk management strategies that you should adopt when using online communication. For email, consider the use of encryption. Also, make sure the client is the only one who has access to the email. Be careful about using a client’s work email address, for instance, as the employer may have a right to access to this email. If your client is in an abusive relationship, you may want to forgo email altogether, as the perpetrator of abuse may try to gain access to emails that you send to the client.

7. Develop and implement a system to monitor and respond to risks.
Assume that you want to allow clients to share information about how to cope with separation and make use of community-based resources. If you develop a discussion board, consider risks such as the use of vulgar language, sharing private information about the child or other parent, or suggestions that seem inappropriate. Rather than allow clients to post suggestions themselves, you could have clients send you suggestions and take responsibility for screening them and posting ones that are appropriate.

8. Keep abreast of the most current communication technology, ethics protocols, and research.
Note that the best knowledge today could be outdated tomorrow… or perhaps within a few months. Technology changes quickly. Threats to the integrity of technology change. Best practices and our understanding of the appropriate use of technology change. Agencies, professional associations, and governments may also change their views on whether and how to use a particular form of technology. Do you know, for instance, your professional association’s policy on the use of smart phones for communication with clients? Further, what are the relative risks of using landlines versus smart phones?

9. Maintain clear and appropriate boundaries between personal and professional communication.
If you allow clients to text or call you on your cell phone, they may assume they have 24/7 access to you. If you answer text messages or phone calls from home, you also need to consider whether you are providing clients with the same confidentiality as you would provide if you responded from your office. Make sure you establish clear and appropriate boundaries concerning the use of online communication—for yourself and for your clients. Do you use the same cell phone for work and personal purposes? If so, have you considered the use of different phone numbers on the same phone? Also, have you taken precautions with family members to ensure that they do not intentionally or accidentally gain access to private client information on your phone?
10. Ensure clients have an opportunity to provide informed consent to the use of online communication.
When using certain forms of online communication with clients, you may need to explain the technology, how it is being used, its risks and benefits. Ideally, offer the client a choice so that there is a true opportunity for informed consent. Allow the client to ask questions, and consider meeting individually and in person with each client first before relying on online technology. Consider a situation in which there is a history of intimate partner abuse. How can you ensure that you have assessed for power and safety issues before engaging the clients online and how can you allow the parties to share their concerns in a safe, confidential manner? By offering, rather than imposing, the use of online technology, the clients are empowered to determine whether to accept or reject its use. Although family law professionals have their own ideas about the appropriateness, safety and effectiveness of online communication, we certainly need to listen to our clients.

Dr. Barsky will present a workshop on this topic, Ethics of Online Communication at the AFCC 50th Anniversary Conference in Los Angeles on May 31, 2013 at 3:30 pm. Dr. Barsky is a professor of social work at Florida Atlantic University, a family mediator, and Chair of the National Ethics Committee of the National Association of Social Workers. His book credits include Conflict Resolution for the Helping Professionals, Clinicians in Court, and Ethics and Values in Social Work. For further information, see http://www.barsky.org/publications/publications.htm.
Pre-conference Institutes
(Separate registration fee required. Please see conference information on page 28 of the conference program brochure for details.)

WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2013
9:00am-4:30pm

1. The Best Interests Parenting Plan Choice: Approximate, Individualize or Template?
The best interests of the child standard has been both widely embraced and repeatedly criticized. The individualized best interests approach has evolved towards comprehensive parenting plans, but complaints persist that it is too costly and time consuming. One alternative, the approximation rule, proposes that parenting plans mimic pre-separation parenting arrangements. Another approach is developmentally-based guidelines that outline minimal or ideal (or both) parenting plans for children of different ages. Participants in this institute will examine the pros and cons of these alternatives from various perspectives, explore the value of parents as primary decision makers, and consider concerns about the impact of conflict on children. Particular emphasis will be placed on how to approach the task of creating parenting plans.
Margaret F. Brinig, JD, PhD, Univ. of Notre Dame Law School, South Bend, IN
Milfred “Bud” Dale, PhD, JD, Topeka, KS
Robert E. Emery, PhD, Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA
Pamela S. Ludolph, PhD, Ann Arbor, MI

2. Judicial Officers Institute: Taking the Testimony of Children
Few family court judges have experience eliciting testimony of children, which can be emotionally-laden, limited by the child’s ability to express information and influenced by parents, grandparents, siblings and others. This institute will provide information judicial officers need to know about how children at different developmental stages express information, how to ask questions that elicit reliable answers, and how to do so in a way that gives children a sense of ease. Participants will have the opportunity to practice their skills with judicial peers. Participation in this session is limited to judicial officers.
Lyn Greenberg, PhD, Los Angeles, CA
Hon. Emilie Kruzick, Toronto, ON, Canada
Aaron D. Robb, MEd, Forensic Counseling Services, Frisco, TX
Hon. Maureen F. Hallahan, San Diego, CA

3. Threats to Neutrality: Biases, Values, Paradigms and Cultural Insensitivity
This institute, for both new and experienced custody evaluators, will address the ways in which biases, values, and paradigms affect evaluator judgment; the acquisition of knowledge and development of skills needed to evaluate culturally diverse families; and the avoidance of wording that is suggestive of bias. Distinctions will be made between attitudinal biases and cognitive biases. Attention will also be given to associative biases—positive biases that develop when evaluators share beliefs, interests, or experiences with litigants.
David A. Martindale, PhD, ABPP, Co-author, The Art and Science of Custody Evaluation, St. Petersburg, FL

4. Risk Assessment for Family Law Professionals: Protecting Ourselves and Others
Risk assessments have become necessary considerations in domestic violence cases for protecting clients and family law professionals from a threat potential. Advanced content will be presented on threat assessments, from a rapid scan approach involving threat posturing, preparatory behaviors and rehearsal fantasies, to a more comprehensive approach that can provide behavioral trajectories to assist with mitigation and containment strategies. Leslie Drozd, PhD, and Lynette Berg Robe, JD, will also present a brief research update on domestic violence and an update on California case law and legislation per requirements for California custody evaluator and mediator update training Rule of Court 5.230. Sponsored by the AFCC California Chapter.
Manny Tau, PsyD, Clinical & Forensic Psychologist, Threat Management Specialist, San Clemente, CA

5. Increasing Creativity in Mediation: From Resistance to New Ideas
This institute is designed for mediators who want to enhance creativity in their clients’ decision making process. In the morning, participants will explore how the fields of psychology, negotiation, communication and neuroscience can help participants understand why people create obstacles to creativity and how traditional brainstorming may actually work against the creative process. In the afternoon, participants will learn cutting edge strategies to design mediation formats and combine facilitative and evaluative interventions. This client-centered approach goes beyond mediation “models” and “styles” and incorporates theory and practice to customize the process for the clients.
Nina Meierding, JD, Bainbridge, WA
Forrest S. Mosten, JD, Los Angeles, CA

6. Introduction to International Child Custody for Lawyers, Evaluators and Judges
Cases in which children or parents will travel, visit or live abroad present significant legal, cultural, economic, psychological, and practical issues in addition to the usual considerations presented when developing parenting plans. In this institute, the presenters will introduce participants to international custody practice. The program will compare and contrast jurisdictional paradigms including the UCCJEA, The Hague Children’s Conventions, and household registration. Discussion will include the roles of private practitioners and government; the roles of forensic mental health professionals in cases where children will travel, visit or reside abroad; cross-border custody decree enforcement, abduction risk and prevention; international relocation; and recovery and reintegration of children removed or retained abroad.
Leslie Ellen Shear, JD, Law Offices of Leslie Ellen Shear, Encino, CA
Elaine Tumonis, JD, California Child Abduction Task Force, California Attorney General’s Office, Los Angeles, CA
Richard Warshak, PhD, Author, Divorce Poison, Dallas, TX

7. Listening to Children in Divorce Processes: An Effective Semi-structured Interview Model
This advanced practice institute presents research supporting the rationale for listening to children in different divorce processes, and a semi-structured child-focused format to guide interviews. Designed for parenting coordinators, mediators, custody evaluators, and child legal representatives, the institute will combine didactic information, small group practice, case examples and discussion. Content includes the conceptual framework, six phases of the interview model, developmental issues in the use of questions and language, techniques for interviewing children and guidance for providing feedback to parents in appropriate settings.
Joan B. Kelly, PhD, Corte Madera, CA

8. Parenting Coordination, Co-parenting and Child Adjustment: A Global Blueprint
This institute is intended for parenting coordinators and others concerned with improving co-parenting relationships in fragile families and high-conflict cases when typical post-divorce parenting interventions fail. Participants will take a broad-based look at what is at stake for children, bringing a global lens to this question by examining similarities and differences in family fragmentation in the US and Italy. Participants will focus on family skills training to address a variety of challenges and on issues not yet understood. Emphasis will be placed on how a close research-practice interface is vital to enhancing outcomes for children and families in the decades ahead.
Debra K. Carter, PhD, National Cooperative Parenting Center, Bradenton, FL
Silvia Mazzoni, PhD, Sapienza Univ., Rome, Italy
James P. McHale, PhD, Univ. South Florida Family Study Center, St. Petersburg, FL
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 103,487

MARCI FRAZIER,
   Appellee,

v.

KELLY GOUDSCHAAL,
   Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to hear and decide a particular type of action. Jurisdiction over subject matter is the power to decide the general question involved and not the exercise of that power.

2. The existence of jurisdiction and standing are both questions of law over which an appellate court's scope of review is unlimited.

3. In this state, a district court has the authority to make an equitable division of property that nonmarried cohabitants accumulated while living together, but only to the extent that such property was jointly accumulated by the parties or acquired by either with the intent that both should have an interest therein.

4. The jurisdiction of equity to grant specific performance of contracts, or to reform or cancel them in a proper case, is well settled.
5. A court may exercise its jurisdiction over a contractual dispute in order to evaluate the contract's legality. Contracts are presumed legal, and the burden rests on the party challenging the contract to prove it is illegal.

6. Under the Kansas Parentage Act (KPA), any interested party may bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. K.S.A. 38-1126. A woman claiming to be a presumptive mother of a child is an interested party under the KPA.

7. The public policy in Kansas requires our courts to act in the best interests of the child when determining the legal obligations to be imposed and the rights to be conferred in a mother and child relationship. After a family unit fails to function, the interests of the children involved become a matter for the State's intrusion in order to avoid jeopardizing the children if a parent's claim for the children is based solely or predominantly on selfish motives.

8. The interpretation and legal effect of written instruments are matters of law, subject to unlimited appellate review without regard to the trial court's determination.

9. Public policy forbids enforcement of an illegal or immoral contract, but it equally insists that those contracts that are lawful and that contravene none of its rules shall be enforced and that they shall not be set aside or held to be invalid on a
suspicion of illegality. A contract is not void as against public policy unless it is injurious to the interests of the public or in contravention of some established interest of society. Illegality from the standpoint of public policy depends upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, and it is the duty of courts to sustain the legality of contracts where possible. There is no presumption that a contract is illegal, and the burden of showing the wrong is upon the party who seeks to deny his or her contractual obligation. The presumption is in favor of innocence, and the taint of wrong is a matter of defense.

10.
A parent may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his or her rights under the Kansas parental preference doctrine.

11.
A coparenting agreement is not automatically rendered unenforceable as violating public policy merely because it contains the biological mother's agreement to share the custody of her children with another, so long as the intent and effect of the arrangement will promote the welfare and best interests of the children.

12.
Denying a child conceived by artificial insemination the opportunity to have two parents through a coparenting agreement does not comport with the constitutional mandate to provide substantive legal equality for all children regardless of the marital status of their parents.
13.

Under the specific facts of this case, the coparenting agreement between the biological mother and her same-sex partner contained no element of immorality or illegality and did not violate public policy, but rather the contract was for the advantage and welfare of the children, rendering it enforceable by the district court to the extent it is in the best interests of the children.


T. Bradley Manson, of Manson & Karbank, of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Elizabeth Rogers Rebein and Kelli M. Broers, of the same firm, were with him on the briefs for appellant.

Dennis J. Stanchik, of Olathe, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.

Stephen Douglas Bonney, chief counsel and legal director, of ACLU of Kansas & Western Missouri, of Kansas City, Missouri, Rose A. Saxe, of Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender & AIDS Projects, of ACLU Foundation, of New York, New York, and Catherine Sakimura, of National Center for Lesbian Rights, of San Francisco, California, were on the brief for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas and Western Missouri, and the National Center for Lesbian Rights.

Linda Henry Elrod, director, was on the brief for amicus curiae Washburn University School of Law Children and Family Law Center.

Stephanie Goodenow, of Law Office of Stephanie Goodenow, LLC, of Olathe, was on the brief for amicus curiae National Association of Social Workers.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOHNSON, J.: Kelly Goudschaal and Marci Frazier were committed to a long-time, same-sex relationship, during which they jointly decided to have two children via artificial insemination. In conjunction with the birth of each child, the couple executed a coparenting agreement that, among other provisions, addressed the contingency of a separation. A few months after the couple separated, Goudschaal notified Frazier that she was taking the children to Texas, prompting Frazier to file this action, seeking inter alia to enforce the coparenting agreement. The district court's final order divided all of the women's property, awarded the couple joint legal custody of the two children, designated Goudschaal as the residential custodian, established unsupervised parenting time for Frazier, and ordered Frazier to pay child support. Goudschaal appeals, questioning the district court's division of her individually owned property and challenging the district court's jurisdiction and authority to award joint custody and parenting time to an unrelated third person. We find that the district court had the legal authority to enter its orders, but we remand for further factual findings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Parties' Relationship

The relationship of Frazier and Goudschaal began in 1995. At some point, the couple decided to start a family, utilizing assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in the form of artificial insemination. Originally, the plan was for both women to become pregnant, so that they could share a child from each partner. But when Frazier was unable to conceive, they mutually agreed that Goudschaal would bear both children. In 2002, Goudschaal gave birth to their first daughter; their second daughter was born in 2004.

Before the birth of their first daughter, Frazier and Goudschaal signed a coparenting agreement. In 2004, the couple executed another coparenting agreement that made provisions for the second child. That agreement identified Frazier as a de facto
parent and specified that her "relationship with the children should be protected and promoted"; that the parties intended "to jointly and equally share parental responsibility"; that each of the parties "shall pay the same percent of [child] support as her net income compares to [their] combined net incomes"; "that all major decisions affecting [the] children . . . shall be made jointly by both parties"; and that in the event of a separation "the person who has actual physical custody w[ould] take all steps necessary to maximize the other's visitation" with the children. In addition, both a consent for medical authorization and a durable power of attorney for health care decisions were executed. Further, each woman executed a last will and testament that named the other as the children's guardian.

Goudschaal, Frazier, and the two children lived together as a family unit. The adults jointly purchased a home, jointly owned personal property, and shared bank accounts. Although Frazier was primarily responsible for handling the couple's financial transactions, both parties contributed to the payment of bills and to the educational accounts for the children. For their part, the children used their legal surname of "Goudschaal-Frazier," and, notwithstanding the absence of a biological connection, both children called Frazier "Mother" or "Mom." The teachers and daycare providers with whom the family interacted treated both Frazier and Goudschaal as the girls' coequal parents.

At some point, the adults' relationship began to unravel, and by September 2007, Frazier and Goudschaal were staying in separate bedrooms. In January 2008, Goudschaal moved out of their home. For nearly half a year thereafter, the women continued to share parenting responsibilities and maintained equal parenting time with the girls. In July, however, Goudschaal began to decrease Frazier's contact with the girls, allowing her visitation only 1 day each week and every other weekend. Finally, in October 2008, Goudschaal informed Frazier that she had accepted a new job in Texas and intended to
move there with both girls within a week. Frazier responded by seeking relief in the Johnson County District Court.

Proceedings in the District Court

Frazier first filed a petition to enforce the 2004 coparenting agreement. She also filed a separate petition for equitable partition of the couple's real and personal property. The first petition was later dismissed, and the petition for partition was amended to include the request to enforce the coparenting agreement. Goudschaal responded with a motion to dismiss, claiming that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address Frazier's requests for child custody or parenting time and arguing that the court could not properly divide certain portions of the parties' individually titled property.

The district court denied Goudschaal's motion to dismiss, opining that the district court had "two separate and independent bases for jurisdiction." First, the court held that the petitioner had invoked the court's equitable jurisdiction to determine whether "highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances" existed which would permit the court to apply the best interests of the child test to grant Frazier reasonable parenting time, notwithstanding the parental preference doctrine.

Secondly, the district court found jurisdiction under the Kansas Parentage Act (KPA), K.S.A. 38-1110 et seq., to consider Frazier's claim that she is a nonbiological parent. Specifically, the district court pointed out that K.S.A. 38-1126 provides that "[a]ny interested party may bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship." (Emphasis added.) The court considered Frazier as having interested party status by virtue of her claim that she has notoriously and in writing acknowledged the mother and child relationship with these children. See K.S.A. 38-1113(a) (motherhood can be established "under this act"); K.S.A. 38-1114(a)(4)
(paternity can be established by notoriously or in writing recognizing that status); and K.S.A. 38-1126 (insofar as practicable, the provisions of the KPA applicable to the father and child relationship also apply to the mother and child relationship).

At the hearing on the petition, in addition to presenting the coparenting agreement, the parties stipulated to the value of the house and proffered evidence regarding all their assets and liabilities, such as retirement accounts, tax returns, mortgages, and income. The district court concluded that the parties lived and operated as a couple who had comingled their assets and thus each had an equitable interest in the other's financial accounts. The court noted that "[e]ach party received the benefit of sharing bills and responsibilities in a family setting." As a result, the court concluded it would result in unjust enrichment if the assets and liabilities were not equitably divided. Accordingly, the court ordered an equalization payment of $36,500 to Frazier and assigned $60,000 of the second mortgage debt on the house to Goudschaal. The debt assignment was required because, as the court acknowledged, Goudschaal's retirement account could not be divided with a nonspouse.

Regarding the children, the district court determined that an award of joint custody was in the best interests of the children. Goudschaal was awarded residential custody. Frazier was ordered to pay monthly child support and was granted reasonable parenting time. After Frazier resumed visitation with the girls, they began to experience behavioral problems that prompted their being placed in therapy. However, the record does not contain any reports from that therapist.

Goudschaal appealed the district court's decision. The appeal was transferred to this court on its own motion. K.S.A. 20-3018(c).
Arguments on Appeal

Given the manner in which the arguments have been presented to us and to assure the parties that we have considered all of their respective arguments, we take the liberty of beginning by summarizing the parties' arguments on appeal.

Appellant

Goudschaal's brief to this court asserts two issues, albeit the first issue is divided into subparts. The overarching complaint on the first issue is that the district court violated Goudschaal's constitutionally protected parental rights when it awarded joint custody and parenting time to a nonparent, i.e., Frazier. Goudschaal summarily dismisses the coparenting agreement by declaring that "an action to enforce a co-parenting agreement . . . is not a cause of action recognized by Kansas courts."

Citing to Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982), Goudschaal starts with the premise that child custody is a parent's fundamental right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that such protection includes the right to make decisions concerning one's children's care, custody, and control. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). Relying on state law applying a parental preference doctrine and the notion that parents are presumed to do what is best for their children, Goudschaal then contends that the State cannot interfere with a biological parent's fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her children unless there has been a judicial finding that the natural parent is unfit, which did not occur in this case.

Goudschaal asserts that she is the only person with the constitutionally protected status of parent of her children and that Frazier is simply an unrelated third party.
Goudschaal refuses to accept that the KPA would permit a person who is not the biological mother of a child or who has not legally adopted the child to become a "mother" within the meaning of the KPA. Specifically, she contends that any presumption arising from a notorious or written acknowledgment of maternity is always rebutted if there is another female who is the known and undisputed birth mother. In other words, Goudschaal argues that known biological lineage always and definitively trumps any statutory presumption of parenthood. She suggests that nothing in the KPA provides for there to be two mothers, as the district court suggested. Finally, and perhaps more fundamentally, Goudschaal suggests that the question of whether Frazier could be a parent under the KPA is academic because the district court never made that explicit finding in this case.

Goudschaal then argues that, by not qualifying as a legal parent, Frazier has no standing to petition for custody of a child who is not a child in need of care and who has a natural parent who is not alleged to be unfit. Goudschaal points out that this court has said that "'[i]n the absence of an adjudication that a natural parent is unfit to have custody of a child, the parent has the paramount right to custody as opposed to third parties . . . ."' In re Guardianship of Williams, 254 Kan. 814, 826, 869 P.2d 661 (1994) (quoting Herbst v. Herbst, 211 Kan. 163, 163, 505 P.2d 294 [1973]). Likewise, Goudschaal recites that

"'[t]here is no mechanism for a third party to intervene in the relationships of an intact family that has not subjected itself to judicial intervention or failed society's minimal requirements for adequate parenting.' Morris, Grandparents, Uncles, Aunts, Cousins, Friends: How is the court to decide which relationships will continue?, 12 Family Advocate 11 (Fall 1989)." In re Hood, 252 Kan. 689, 691, 847 P.2d 1300 (1993).

Continuing in the same vein, Goudschaal avers that the district court erred in finding that it had equitable jurisdiction to award visitation to a third party such as Frazier. Pointing to Hood, Goudschaal contends that there is no common-law right of
third-party visitation, but rather those rights have to originate with the legislature. See 252 Kan. at 693-94. Additionally, she quotes from our Court of Appeals, in State ex rel. Secretary of Dept. of S.R.S. v. Davison, 31 Kan. App. 2d 192, Syl. ¶ 3, 64 P.3d 434 (2002): "Third-party visitation is a creature of statute and in derogation of a parent's constitutional right to direct the upbringing of his or her children. Third-party visitation statutes must, therefore, be strictly construed." Moreover, Goudschaal warns that if courts entertain visitation requests based on what is in the best interests of the children, that will "open[] a floodgate without establishing any boundaries," and the result will be an increase in the intrusion by the courts into a family's private life caused by "ex-boyfriends, ex-girlfriends, aunts, uncles, guardians, teachers, daycare providers, nannies, or any other individuals who have formed a relationship with the child."

The remedy Goudschaal seeks is for this court to vacate the district court's order granting Frazier joint custody and parenting time. She does not mention vacating the portion of the order that requires Frazier to pay her child support.

For her second issue, Goudschaal complains that the district court treated the division of the parties' assets as if it were a marital dissolution by adding up all of the assets, subtracting all of the debts, and dividing the remainder in half. She contends that our caselaw has invested district courts with authority to divide the property of cohabitants only to the extent that such property was "jointly accumulated by the parties or acquired by either with the intent that each should have an interest therein." Eaton v. Johnston, 235 Kan. 323, Syl. ¶ 2, 681 P.2d 606 (1984). Although Goudschaal concedes that the largest asset, the residential real estate, was a jointly acquired, divisible asset, she complains that the parties' retirement accounts and insurance policies were separate, individual accounts. She asks for the case to be remanded for a reconsideration of the division of assets, applying the appropriate standard.
As an aside, the parties appear to overlook the irony of Goudschaal's concession that Kansas courts have jurisdiction over the jointly acquired property of cohabiting adults, while arguing that those same courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over the children brought into existence by the same cohabiting adults. Nevertheless, that is Goudschaal's position on appeal.

**Appellee**

Frazier sets up her brief with seven issues, six of which address various aspects of the overarching question of whether the district court had the jurisdiction and authority to award her joint custody and parenting time. The final issue discusses the division of property.

In her first issue, Frazier asserts that the KPA provided a basis for the district court's exercise of jurisdiction in this case. She acknowledges the absence of an explicit statement from the district court declaring Frazier to be a parent within the meaning of the KPA. Nevertheless, she argues that such a finding can reasonably be inferred from the court's orders and the record as a whole.

Pointing to this court's decision in *In re Marriage of Ross*, 245 Kan. 591, 783 P.2d 331 (1989), Frazier disputes Goudschaal's contention that biology is the paramount question in this state. *Ross* held that a district court cannot order genetic testing to determine whether a man is the biological father of a child for whom the man had previously acknowledged paternity, unless the court first determines that such testing will be in the best interests of the child. 245 Kan. at 597. *Ross* found that the Uniform Parentage Act, upon which the KPA was based, is designed to provide for the equal and beneficial treatment of all children, regardless of their parents' marital status. 245 Kan. at 597. Consequently, Frazier characterizes the holding in *Ross* to be that in any action
under the KPA, the court must always act in the best interests of the child "when imposing legal obligations or conferring legal rights on the mother/child relationship and the father/child relationship." 245 Kan. at 597.

Frazier also argues in favor of the district court's interpretation of the KPA provisions to permit the establishment of maternity through the presumption in K.S.A. 38-1114(a)(4), i.e., where parenthood has been recognized "notoriously or in writing." She points out that Goudschaal voluntarily created and fostered Frazier's public persona as a mother of the two children. Accordingly, Frazier labels Goudschaal's "open the floodgates" argument as "simply a time worn red herring."

Finally in her first issue, Frazier contends that the district court was correct in observing that there is nothing in the KPA to prevent a finding that these children had two mothers. Frazier then points out that, if the court cannot utilize the statutory presumptions, the children will be precluded from ever having two parents because of K.S.A. 38-1114(f), which does not recognize a sperm donor as the child's father without a written agreement between mother and donor. See In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 72-73, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007) (upholding constitutionality of K.S.A. 38-1114[f]), cert. denied 555 U.S. 937 (2008).

In her next issue, Frazier addresses Goudschaal's major premise that the court's exercise of jurisdiction over child custody and parenting time violated Goudschaal's constitutional due process rights. Frazier contends that Goudschaal knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights when she entered into the coparenting agreement and continued to abide by the agreement even after the couple separated. Frazier points to In re Marriage of Nelson, 34 Kan. App. 2d 879, 125 P.3d 1081, rev. denied 281 Kan. 1378 (2006), where the Court of Appeals upheld a waiver of the constitutionally based parental preference rights in this state.
Alternatively, in the next issue, Frazier contends that cases from the United States Supreme Court dealing with a parent's liberty interest have not focused on the biological connection, but rather they turn upon the relationship between parent and child. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1983) (mere existence of biological link does not merit due process protection; father who fails to develop relationship with child not automatically entitled to direct where child's best interests lie). Frazier then creatively argues that if a natural parent is not entitled to due process protection in the absence of a parent and child relationship, the corollary must also be true, i.e., a meaningful and well-established relationship with a nonbiological parent should be afforded constitutional protection. She points out that the presumption that a parent will always act in the best interests of his or her child only makes sense where the natural bonds of affection between parent and child have developed over time, rather than merely through genetics. Finally, she argues that Troxel cannot be read as making unfitness of the biological parent a mandatory condition precedent to State intervention in custody and visitation disputes with a nonbiological parent, but rather a court must always balance the competing interests.

In her fourth issue, Frazier separately addresses the parental preference doctrine and contends that it does not bar her request to enforce the coparenting agreement. She devotes considerable space in her brief arguing why this court was wrong in Sheppard v. Sheppard, 230 Kan. 146, 149-54, 630 P.2d 1121 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 919 (1982), when it declared unconstitutional a 1980 amendment to K.S.A. 60-1610(b), which modified the parental preference doctrine. Elsewhere, Frazier argues that if the parental preference doctrine really creates inviolable rights in biological parents, then a court could not refuse to do DNA testing based on the best interests of the child, as the Ross court held.
For her fifth issue, Frazier presents reasons she believes the district court had equitable jurisdiction to consider this case. She contends that her pleadings can be construed as an action seeking specific performance of the coparenting agreement. She counters the argument that the agreement is unenforceable as an unlawful assignment of parental duties by pointing out that Goudschaal did not abdicate any of her responsibilities but rather simply agreed to share the children's parenting. Moreover, Frazier argues simply that there are times when the best interests of the child outweigh the need to strictly adhere to the biological connection.

For her last issue on child custody and parenting disputes, Frazier attempts to find jurisdiction in this state's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), K.S.A. 38-1336 et seq. Specifically, Frazier asserts that she fits within the definition of "[p]erson acting as a parent" under K.S.A. 38-1337(14). But she acknowledges that the district court did not base its jurisdiction on that statute and did not make any factual findings in that regard.

With respect to the division of property, Frazier conceded in her brief that the district court did not make any findings as to which items of the couples' property were jointly acquired or acquired with the intent that they both would share it, as required by Eaton, 235 Kan. 323. Accordingly, Frazier also asks that the case be remanded to permit the district court to make the requisite findings.

Amici Curiae

Three amicus curiae briefs were filed in this case. One on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas and Western Missouri, and the National Center for Lesbian Rights (collectively ACLU); one by Linda Henry Elrod, Director of the Washburn University School of Law Children and Family Law
Center; and one by the National Association of Social Workers (NASW). All three briefs were proffered in support of Frazier's claims.

The ACLU brief suggests factors to consider in determining whether a person has become a de facto or functional parent. The ACLU argues that Frazier should be deemed such a parent either because of extraordinary circumstances or because Goudschaal waived her superior rights as a biological mother and the waiver must be acknowledged to prevent harm to the children. The brief points out that there is a fundamental difference between the circumstance where a third-party is seeking to supplant or superecede the biological mother's rights and the current circumstance where a nonbiological caretaker seeks to share parental duties and responsibilities with the biological mother.

The Elrod brief points us to In re Guardianship of Williams, 254 Kan. at 820-21, which held that courts may intervene to prevent harm to a child in extraordinary or unusual circumstances. Elrod contends that the use of ART necessarily creates extraordinary circumstances in parent and child relationships. Moreover, Elrod argues that enforcing ART agreements, such as the coparenting agreement in connection with the artificial insemination in this case, protects children by providing clarity and predictability. The brief also shares three theories which have been used by other states to grant nonbiological caretakers custody and parenting rights: (1) estoppel; (2) recognition of a parent-like status, whether labeled functional parent, psychological parent, or de facto parent; and (3) a finding that the person is a presumed parent under the applicable state parentage acts. The brief also points us to our decision in In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. at 72-73, where we found that, without a written agreement, a sperm donor has no standing to assert parental rights to the child born via artificial insemination.

The NASW brief provides us with a number of reasons why the law should be what that amicus would like it to be, i.e., investing a person in Frazier's circumstances
with rights akin to a natural parent. NASW informs us that the formation of attachment bonds is critical to a child's healthy development; that attachment relationships develop despite the absence of a biological or legal connection between parent and child; that sexual orientation is irrelevant to the development of strong parent and child attachments; and that children experience severe emotional and psychological harm when their attachment relationships are severed.

JURISDICTION AND STANDING

Goudschaal contends that the most fundamental flaw in these proceedings is that Frazier lacked standing to request the relief she sought, which is a jurisdictional question, and that the district court generally lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Frazier's amended petition. At times, Goudschaal appears to equate jurisdiction with the efficacy of Frazier's claims for relief. Which party should win a lawsuit is an altogether different question from that of whether the court has the power to say who wins. Moreover, a person's claim to be protected by rights under the federal Constitution does not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to determine the applicability of those rights. As we said recently in Miller v. Glacier Development Co., 293 Kan. 665, 669, 270 P.3d 1065 (2011):

"Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to hear and decide a particular type of action. Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Simmons, 274 Kan. 194, 205, 50 P.3d 66 (2002). Jurisdiction over subject matter is the power to decide the general question involved, and not the exercise of that power. Babcock v. City of Kansas City, 197 Kan. 610, 618, 419 P.2d 882 (1966)."

Standard of Review

"The existence of jurisdiction and standing are both questions of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited. Schmidtliein Electric, Inc. v. Greathouse, 278
Analysis

Goudschaal does not question the district court's jurisdiction to hear and decide Frazier's request for a property division. In this state, a district court has the authority to make an equitable division of property that nonmarried cohabitants accumulated while living together. See, e.g., Eaton, 235 Kan. at 328. Consequently, Frazier's petition stated a claim upon which relief could be granted by the district court, and dismissal of the entire case would have been improper. Cf. Nungesser v. Bryant, 283 Kan. 550, 559, 153 P.3d 1277 (2007) (appellate court must reverse dismissal for failure to state a claim if alleged facts and inferences support a claim on any possible theory).

Instead, Goudschaal contends that our courts only have the authority to address Frazier's issues on child custody, parenting time, and support when such issues are presented in a divorce action involving two married persons, who would necessarily have to be a man and a woman in this state, or when considering a visitation request by a grandparent or stepparent. See K.S.A. 60-1610; K.S.A. 60-1616; K.S.A. 38-129. She argues that the district court read too much into K.S.A. 60-201(b) when it found therein a grant of equitable jurisdiction over these issues.

The parties' arguments over whether the district court had "equitable jurisdiction" may be misdirected. Equitable jurisdiction refers to the authority of the court to impose a remedy that is not available at law. See Stauth v. Brown, 241 Kan. 1, 11, 734 P.2d 1063 (1987) (quoting 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity § 70, p. 593) (where "there is no adequate remedy by an action at law . . . , a court of equity, in the furtherance of justice, may
In *Place v. Place*, 207 Kan. 734, Syl. ¶ 3, 486 P.2d 1354 (1971), this court suggested that even a court of equity must first have "acquired jurisdiction of a subject matter," intimating that something more than a need to do justice is required. But once that subject matter jurisdiction is established, the court "will reach out and draw into its consideration and determination the entire subject matter and bring before it the parties interested therein, so that a full, complete, effectual and final decree adjusting the rights and equities of all the parties in interest may be entered and enforced." 207 Kan. 734, Syl. ¶ 3.

An aspect of the equitable relief sought by Frazier was to have Goudschaal specifically perform under the coparenting agreement. "The jurisdiction of equity to grant specific performance of contracts, or to reform or cancel them in a proper case, is well settled." *Stauth*, 241 Kan. at 11 (quoting 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity § 70, p. 593). Goudschaal summarily dismisses that jurisdictional basis on the ground that the coparenting agreement was an unenforceable contract. But a court may exercise its jurisdiction over a contractual dispute in order to evaluate the contract's legality. See *National Bank of Andover v. Kansas Bankers Surety Co.*, 290 Kan. 247, 257, 225 P.3d 707 (2010) (quoting *Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Will Investments, Inc.*, 261 Kan. 125, 129, 928 P.2d 73 [1996]) ("[c]ontracts are presumed legal and the burden rests on the party challenging the contract to prove it is illegal"). Accordingly, the district court clearly had jurisdiction to address the consequences of the termination of the parties' cohabitation arrangement and to determine whether the coparenting agreement in this circumstance unlawfully violated public policy.

Frazier also contended that she had a mother and child relationship with both children, in all respects other than biology. Accordingly, the trial court looked to the KPA provision that permits any interested party to bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. K.S.A. 38-1126. Goudschaal challenges
that holding by pointing to the definition of parent and child relationship in K.S.A. 38-1111, which speaks to the legal relationship between the child and the child's *biological or adoptive* parents. In essence, Goudschaal argues that one must claim to be a biological or an adoptive parent in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to K.S.A. 38-1126.

But the only constraint to bringing an action to determine the existence of a mother and child relationship set forth in K.S.A. 38-1126 is that the petitioner be an "interested party." Goudschaal's suggestion that only a biological or an adoptive parent can be an "interested party" under 38-1126 fails to consider the other provisions of the KPA. Specifically, K.S.A. 38-1114(a) provides for the presumptive establishment of a father and child relationship in certain circumstances, to-wit:

"(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:

"(1) The man and the child's mother are, or have been, married to each other and the child is born during the marriage or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death or by the filing of a journal entry of a decree of annulment or divorce.

"(2) Before the child's birth, the man and the child's mother have attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is void or voidable and:

(A) If the attempted marriage is voidable, the child is born during the attempted marriage or within 300 days after its termination by death or by the filing of a journal entry of a decree of annulment or divorce; or

(B) if the attempted marriage is void, the child is born within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation.

"(3) After the child's birth, the man and the child's mother have married, or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is void or voidable and:

(A) The man has acknowledged paternity of the child in writing;

(B) with the man's consent, the man is named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate; or
(C) the man is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or by a court order.

"(4) The man notoriously or in writing recognizes paternity of the child, including but not limited to a voluntary acknowledgment made in accordance with K.S.A. 38-1130 or 65-2409a, and amendments thereto.

"(5) Genetic test results indicate a probability of 97% or greater that the man is the father of the child.

"(6) The man has a duty to support the child under an order of support regardless of whether the man has ever been married to the child's mother."

Obviously, except for subsection (5), the parental relationship for a father can be legally established under the KPA without the father actually being a biological or adoptive parent. That is important because K.S.A. 38-1113 states that a mother "may be established . . . under this act [KPA]" and K.S.A. 38-1126, dealing with the determination of the mother and child relationship, specifically incorporates the provisions of the KPA applicable to the father and child relationship, insofar as practicable. A harmonious reading of all of the KPA provisions indicates that a female can make a colorable claim to being a presumptive mother of a child without claiming to be the biological or adoptive mother, and, therefore, can be an "interested party" who is authorized to bring an action to establish the existence of a mother and child relationship.

Moreover, what is conspicuously absent from Goudschaal's jurisdictional arguments is any consideration of the power of Kansas courts to protect the interests of our children. We have declared that the public policy in Kansas requires our courts to act in the best interests of the children when determining the legal obligations to be imposed and the rights to be conferred in the mother and child relationship. See *In the Marriage of Ross*, 245 Kan. 591, Syl. ¶ 2, 783 P.2d 331 (1989). Further, after the family unit fails to function, "the child's interests become a matter for the State's intrusion," in order to avoid jeopardizing the child if "a parent's claim for the child is based solely or predominantly
on [selfish] motives." 245 Kan. at 602. In order to accomplish this *parens patriae* function of protecting our children, the district court must necessarily be invested with subject matter jurisdiction.

In short, we find that the district court had the authority to divide the parties' property; to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship between Frazier and the two children; to determine the validity and effect of the coparenting agreement; and to enter such orders with respect to child custody, parenting time, and child support that are in the best interests of the children.

**Validity of Coparenting Agreement**

Key to our decision is a consideration of the efficacy of the parties' coparenting agreement. As noted, Goudschaal summarily dismisses the agreement as unenforceable, apparently believing that such an agreement is always contrary to public policy and, thus, invalid as a matter of law. We disagree with that blanket condemnation.

*Standard of Review*


*Analysis*
More than a half century ago, in *In re Estate of Shirk*, 186 Kan. 311, Syl. ¶ 7, 350 P.2d 1 (1960), this court found that not all contracts in which a parent shares or transfers child custody to a nonparent are unenforceable on public policy grounds. There, a mother of a small child orally agreed with her mother—the child's grandmother—to consent to the grandmother's adoption of the child, in return for the grandmother's promise that the mother and child would inherit the grandmother's estate in equal shares with the grandmother's son, i.e., one-third each. In addition, grandmother agreed that, if mother married a suitable person who wished to adopt the child, grandmother would consent to mother's readoption. Later, grandmother added the additional requirement that mother leave the city in which grandmother was raising the child. Mother fully performed her part of the bargain, including relocating to another city. Grandmother partially performed, including giving her consent to mother's readoption of the child after mother remarried, but she failed to provide for the inheritance to the mother and child. Mother sought to enforce the contract against the grandmother's estate, but the district court granted a demurrer, finding the contract unenforceable as violating the statute of frauds and contravening public policy.

On appeal, after finding that the oral contract was supported by adequate consideration and was otherwise enforceable by the mother, the *Shirk* court ultimately opined that "[the] controversy resolves itself down to the question whether the contract with respect to the mother's rights violated public policy." 186 Kan. at 323. In that regard, *Shirk* noted that it was so "fundamental that parents may not barter or sell their children nor may they demand pecuniary gain as the price of consent to adoptions . . . that citation of authority is unnecessary." 186 Kan. at 323. But the court then quoted from 39 Am. Jur., Parent and Child § 30, pp. 621-22, emphasizing that in some jurisdictions an adoption contract or an agreement for the transfer of child custody is not contrary to public policy.
"merely because it provides for the surrender by a parent of his [or her] child to another in consideration of the latter's promise to give or leave money or property to the parent or to the child, where it appears that the contract is in fact one which is promotive of the welfare and best interests of the child . . . ." 186 Kan. at 323.

Enroute to finding "nothing in the contract as alleged which renders it illegal or void or as against public policy," 186 Kan. at 326, Shirk related the following principles:

"Public policy forbids enforcement of an illegal or immoral contract, but it equally insists that those contracts which are lawful and which contravene none of its rules shall be enforced, and that they shall not be set aside or held to be invalid on a suspicion of illegality. A contract is not void as against public policy unless injurious to the interests of the public or contravenes some established interest of society (17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 211d, p. 570). Illegality from the standpoint of public policy depends upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case (Stewart v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 141 Kan. 175, 39 P.2d 918 [1935]), and it is the duty of courts to sustain the legality of contracts where possible (Foltz v. Struxness, 168 Kan. 714, 215 P.2d 133 [1950]). There is no presumption that a contract is illegal, and the burden of showing the wrong is upon him who seeks to deny his obligation thereunder. The presumption is in favor of innocence and the taint of wrong is a matter of defense (Mosher v. Kansas Coop Wheat Mkt. Ass'n, 136 Kan. 269, 15 P.2d 421 [1932]; Okerberg v. Crable, 185 Kan. 211, 341 P.2d 966 [1959])." 186 Kan. at 326.

A review of the facts and circumstances of the agreement convinced the Shirk court that "[w]hat was done for [the child] was highly commendable and [the child's] interests were best served by the family agreement." 186 Kan. at 325. The court opined that to find grandmother's promise of an inheritance to be "contrary to public policy, we must ascribe the basest of motives and the most evil of intentions to the mother." 186 Kan. at 326. Shirk declined to do so and refused to declare the contract unenforceable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the lower court to proceed to trial.
Much more recently, our Court of Appeals upheld a child custody agreement that placed the custody of children with a nonparent. *In re Marriage of Nelson*, 34 Kan. App. 2d 879, 125 P.3d 1081, *rev. denied* 283 Kan. 1378 (2006). In *Nelson*, a divorcing mother and father agreed to place custody of their children with the father's sister—the children's aunt—and memorialized the parenting agreement in the final divorce decree. Placement was not made with the mother because of her continuing relationship with a boyfriend who was on diversion for engaging in sexually inappropriate contact with a 4-year-old child. After the divorce, mother married the boyfriend and sought to modify the parenting plan, claiming a material change in circumstances. The district court dismissed the modification motion for failure to show a material change in circumstances. Mother appealed, asserting that the parental preference doctrine entitled her, rather than the aunt, to have custody of her biological children, notwithstanding the circumstances. In essence, mother was asserting that her parental preference trumped any risk of harm to the children.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals embraced the district court's reasoning that a parent can waive his or her rights under the parental preference doctrine. The panel noted that the mother's express waiver of her rights under the parental preference doctrine was accompanied with an acknowledgement that she had been advised by counsel "of the Kansas Constitutional provisions concerning parental preference," and "that the facts and circumstances warrant the third party placement and that the third party placement is in the best interest of the minor children." 34 Kan. App. 2d at 884. The panel upheld the district court's enforcement of the parenting agreement. 34 Kan. App. 2d at 888.

Obviously, *Shirk* and *Nelson* are not perfect analogs with the instant case. For instance, both of those cases involved a transfer of child custody to a family member, *i.e.*, a grandmother and an aunt, respectively. On the other hand, both *Shirk* and *Nelson*
involved the outright transfer of custody by the biological parent, whereas, here, the biological mother created a coparenting arrangement that simply shared her parenting duties with another without relinquishing her responsibilities as a parent. Moreover, as a matter of law, Goudschaal would be deemed to have retained certain parental duties because her parental rights had not been terminated. Cf. State ex rel. Secretary of SRS v. Bohrer, 286 Kan. 898, 908-09, 189 P.3d 1157 (2008) (natural parent has certain common-law duties which cannot be relieved by consenting to the appointment of a permanent guardian).

Despite factual distinctions, we discern that Shirk instructs us that the coparenting agreement before us is not rendered unenforceable as violating public policy merely because the biological mother agreed to share the custody of her children with another, so long as the intent, and effect, of the arrangement was to promote the welfare and best interests of the children. Likewise, Nelson counsels that where two fit parents knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive their parental preference by entering into a custody agreement with a third party that is in the best interests of the child, the court will enforce the agreement rather than second guess the parents' decision. See 34 Kan. App. 2d at 884-88.

Goudschaal nevertheless suggests that this court's holding in In re Hood, 252 Kan. 689, 847 P.2d 1300 (1993), precludes a district court from granting a nonparent any parental rights except for those specifically set forth by statute. Hood interpreted the grandparent visitation statute, K.S.A. 38-129, and determined that someone who was merely "grandparent like" did not have standing to seek grandparental visitation. In so holding, the Hood court wielded a broad brush, declaring:

"We will not create a new common-law right of third-party visitation. The legislature is the forum to entertain sociological and policy considerations bearing on the well-being of
children in our state. Any expansion of visitation rights to unrelated third parties ought to originate with the legislature." 252 Kan. at 693-94.

It is difficult to square Hood's abdication to the legislature of the court's responsibility for the well-being of this state's children with Ross' declaration that "[p]ublic policy requires courts to act in the best interests of the child when determining the legal obligations to be imposed and the rights to be conferred in the mother/child relationship and the father/child relationship." 245 Kan. 591, Syl. ¶ 2. Nevertheless, Hood is factually distinguishable. We are not presented with a circumstance where an unrelated third party wants to become involved with a child who commenced life with two biological parents. The situation presented here is an agreement between two adults to utilize artificial insemination to bring children into the world to be raised and nurtured by the both of them. The biological mother is not abdicating her duties and responsibilities as a parent; she is sharing them. There is not a biological father to displace. See K.S.A. 38-1114(f) (semen donor to inseminate nonwife "is treated in law as if he were not the birth father of a child thereby conceived"); see also In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 73, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007) (sperm donor must have written agreement with mother to have standing to assert parental rights), cert. denied 555 U.S. 937 (2008).

Further, the court in Hood was presented with the question of whether it should create the designation of "psychological parent" based on the facts and circumstances of the case. 252 Kan. at 693-94. But here we need not decide on a label to be applied to Frazier because the parties have done that for us. The coparenting agreement designates Frazier as a "de facto parent." As indicated above, reading K.S.A. 38-1114(a)(4) in conjunction with K.S.A. 38-1113 and K.S.A. 38-1126, the KPA permits the creation of presumptive motherhood through written acknowledgement.
Goudschaal would have us ignore the coparenting agreement and the parental designation therein because of both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Kansas parental preference doctrine. But we disagree with Goudschaal's application of those concepts to this factual scenario.

Granted, in *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000), the United States Supreme Court struck down a Washington state statute that gave *anyone* the right to petition the court for child visitation. In doing so, the Supreme Court reiterated that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children. 530 U.S. at 65-66. Likewise, the well-established parental preference doctrine in this state recognizes that

"a parent who is able to care for his children and desires to do so, and who has not been found to be an unfit person to have their custody in an action or proceeding where that question is in issue, is entitled to the custody of his children as against others who have no permanent or legal right to their custody.'

"The best interests of the child test . . . has long been the preferred standard to apply when the custody of minor children is at issue between the natural parents of the child or children. However, absent highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances it has no application in determining whether a parent, not found to be unfit, is entitled to custody as against a third-party nonparent." *In re Guardianship of Williams*, 254 Kan. 814, 818, 826, 869 P.2d 661 (1994).

But what Goudschaal overlooks is the fact that she exercised her due process right to decide upon the care, custody, and control of her children and asserted her preference as a parent when she entered into the coparenting agreement with Frazier. If a parent has a constitutional right to make the decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of his or her children, free of government interference, then that parent should have the right to
enter into a coparenting agreement to share custody with another without having the
government interfere by nullifying that agreement, so long as it is in the best interests of
the children. Further, as Nelson recognized, parental preference can be waived and, as
Frazier points out, the courts should not be required to assign to a mother any more rights
than that mother has claimed for herself.

Looking at the coparenting agreement from the other side, the children were third-
party beneficiaries of that contract. They would have a reliance interest in maintaining the
inherent benefits of having two parents, and severing an attachment relationship formed
under that contract would not only risk emotional and psychological harm, as the NASW
asserts, but also void the benefits to the children that prompted the agreement in the first
instance. So what Goudschaal really wants is to renege on the coparenting agreement
without regard to the rights of or harm to the children, all in the name of constitutionally
protected parental rights. Surely, her constitutional rights do not stretch that far.

Indeed, we rejected the equivalent of Goudschaal's effort in Ross. There, a mother
permitted a presumptive father to develop a familial relationship with her child but then
placed that relationship in jeopardy by seeking to have paternity testing. We refused to
allow the mother to destroy the familial relationship she had permitted to develop
between her child and the presumptive father, without a court first finding that it would
be in the best interests of the child. In other words, notwithstanding the parental
preference doctrine and the biological parents' constitutional rights, Ross required the
district court to consider the rights and determine the best interests of the child before
allowing the mother to get what she wanted. That rationale is equally compelling here. It
is one thing to assert that a nonbiological, same-gender party to a coparenting agreement
has to accept the state of the law at the time of contracting, but quite another to say that
children who are the objects of that agreement must suffer the consequences of their
biological mother's change of heart. Before Goudschaal can assert her parental rights to
assuage her own psychological or emotional needs, she must convince the court that her proposed course of action is in the best interests of the children.

Moreover, as we have pointed out, without the coparenting agreement these children would have only one parent. See K.S.A. 38-1114(f) (semen donor not birth father). Denying the children an opportunity to have two parents, the same as children of a traditional marriage, impinges upon the children's constitutional rights. Creation of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001), upon which our KPA is based, was prompted in part by a series of United States Supreme Court cases that held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required that all children—both legitimate and illegitimate—be afforded equal treatment under the law. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38, 93 S. Ct. 872, 35 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173-76, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 31 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70-72, 88 S. Ct. 1509, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1968). The UPA drafters noted that "in providing substantive legal equality for all children regardless of the marital status of their parents, the [UPA] merely fulfills the mandate of the Constitution." 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001) UPA (1973), Prefatory Note, p. 379. Accordingly, the constitutional rights of the children, as well as those of the parents, must inform our determination of the validity of a coparenting agreement. Here, the agreement effects equality by giving the children two parents. Moreover, the UPA and, in turn, the KPA are gender-neutral, so as to permit both parents to be of the same sex.

To summarize, the coparenting agreement before us cannot be construed as a prohibited sale of the children because the biological mother retains her parental duties and responsibilities. The agreement is not injurious to the public because it provides the children with the resources of two persons, rather than leaving them as the fatherless
children of an artificially inseminated mother. No societal interest has been harmed; no mischief has been done. Like the contract in Shirk, the coparenting agreement here contains "no element of immorality or illegality and did not violate public policy," but rather "the contract was for the advantage and welfare of the child[ren]." See 186 Kan. 311, Syl. ¶ 7. Further, the agreement provides the children with "'substantive legal equality . . . regardless of the marital status of their parents.'" See Ross, 245 Kan. at 596 (quoting 9B U.L.A. 288-89 [1987]); K.S.A. 38-1112. Consequently, the coparenting agreement in this case does not violate public policy and is not unenforceable as a matter of law.

DISTRICT COURT'S RULINGS

Because the coparenting agreement was enforceable, the district court had the discretion to make appropriate orders addressing child custody, reasonable parenting time, and child support. Judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if it (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).

We acknowledge that the district court was exploring new territory in this case. Although it made the finding that its custody and parenting time orders were in the best interests of the children, we discern an absence of sufficient evidence to make that determination. For instance, the reason that the children allegedly began experiencing problems after recommencement of visitation with Frazier is unexplained in the record. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to remand the case to further explore the best interests of the children and, in that regard, to appoint an attorney to represent the children's interests.
With respect to the division of the parties' property, the district court made a blanket finding that the parties intended to share everything. But, pursuant to Eaton v. Johnson, 235 Kan. 323, Syl. ¶ 2, 681 P.2d 606 (1984), the court should conduct an asset-by-asset determination of whether each item was "jointly accumulated by the parties or acquired by either with the intent that each should have an interest therein." Accordingly, the request of both parties to remand for a redetermination of the property division, utilizing the Eaton standard, is granted.

Affirmed in part and remanded with directions.

BRUCE T. GATTERMAN, District Judge, assigned.¹

¹ REPORTER'S NOTE: Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution, Judge Gatterman was appointed to hear case No. 103,487 to fill the vacancy on the court created by the retirement of Chief Justice Robert E. Davis.

* * *

BILES, J., concurring in part: I would hold that the Kansas Parentage Act (KPA), K.S.A. 38-1110 et seq., governs this case and provides sufficient statutory framework to resolve the legal issues advanced by Frazier in her favor as to whether she is a nonbiological parent under the law and entitled to enforce the coparenting agreement. Therefore, I believe it is unnecessary for this court to delve further into what authority it may have under the common law or advance some other public policy rationale to decide the issues presented. I express no opinion on the analysis adopted by the majority.
In my view, we start with jurisdiction. A plain reading of K.S.A. 38-1126, which states that "[a]ny interested party may bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship" gives Frazier standing to present her case. And with jurisdiction established, the district court's finding that Frazier recognized maternity in writing is supported by substantial competent evidence and invokes the KPA's statutory presumptions regarding parenthood under K.S.A. 38-1114(a)(4).

K.S.A. 38-1113(a) provides that a child's mother "may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child or under this act." (Emphasis added.) Looking further into the statutory scheme, K.S.A. 38-1114(a) provides certain statutory presumptions of paternity. And while those statutory presumptions are written in the context of a man being declared the father of a child, K.S.A. 38-1126 instructs that those presumptions are to be read in a gender-neutral manner "insofar as practicable" in an action to determine under the act the existence of a mother and child relationship. In addition to being mandated by statute, this gender-neutral reading is consistent with what this court has found to be one purpose of the KPA, which is to provide for equal and beneficial treatment of all children, regardless of their parent's marital status. See In re Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 597, 783 P.2d 331 (1989); K.S.A. 38-1112. Children resulting from assisted reproductive technologies should enjoy the same treatment, protections, and support as all other children.

From this juncture, we need only look to K.S.A. 38-1114(a)(4), which provides for a presumption of parentage when the child's paternity has been recognized "notoriously or in writing." As outlined in the court's majority decision, substantial competent evidence most certainly supports the district court's finding that the coparenting agreement and other facts were sufficient to invoke that statutory presumption. Put simply, there is no question Goudschaal and Frazier entered into written agreements that
recognized Frazier's status as a coparent and recited that Goudschaal consented to and fostered a parent and child relationship between the children and Frazier.

And to the extent Goudschaal argues now that the statutory presumption in K.S.A. 38-1114(a)(4) should be rebutted due to her biological status over Frazier, K.S.A. 38-1114(c) provides the court with discretion to determine which presumptions should control within "the weightier considerations of policy and logic, including the best interests of the child." Examining the children's best interests, the district court found that it was in the children's best interests to have a parent and child relationship with Frazier. That decision is also supported by substantial competent evidence.

In short, I find the KPA's statutory scheme sufficient to address the issues presented and agree with the analysis adopted in Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012), and Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th 108, 33 Cal. Rptr. 46, 117 P.3d 660 (2005). And based on the KPA, I concur in the majority's result affirming Frazier's parent and child relationship and her rights, duties, and obligations arising therefrom. I agree further with the order to remand for the district court to explore further the best interests of the children and the appointment of an attorney to represent the children's interests. Finally, I agree with the majority as to the division of the parties' property under Eaton v. Johnson, 235 Kan. 323, 681 P.2d 606 (1984).